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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquires billions of dollars of supplies and 
services every year. In fiscal year (FY) 2013, the DoD obligated over $258 billion for 
military-unique weapon systems as well as commercial supplies and services. An 
integral part of the DoD’s contract management process is the source selection 
phase when offerors’ proposals are evaluated and the contract award decision is 
made. A critical aspect of the source selection phase is the evaluation of contractor 
past performance information as part of the overall proposal evaluation process. The 
DoD uses the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS), which 
consists of contractor report cards extracted from the Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). In this research we examine the value of 
CPARS report card narratives for service contracts as they relate to their associated 
objective scores. Our primary focus in this research is to examine if the CPARS 
report card written narrative section provides value to the contractor performance 
evaluation process. Our data analysis includes sentiment and statistical analysis, as 
well as interviews with government agency contracting professionals. Using CPARS 
data, narrative analyses, and interviews, we answer the following research 
questions: (1) To what degree are government contracting professionals submitting 
to CPARS contractor performance narratives in accordance with the guidelines 
provided in the CPARS user’s manual? (2) What is the added value of the contractor 
performance narratives beyond the value of the objective scores for performance? 
(3) What is the statistical relationship between the sentiment contained in the 
narratives and the objective scores for contractor evaluations? The research 
revealed that there are a variety of opportunities to improve the contracting process 
specifically related to the narrative portion of past performance assessment reports.  
Keywords: Services Acquisition, Services Contracts, Success of Services 
Contracts 
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Introduction 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the poor 
management of service contracts has undermined the government’s ability to obtain 
a good value for the money spent and has contributed to the GAO’s decision to 
designate management of services contracts as a high-risk area for the DoD (GAO, 
2013b). In fact, as stressed in a recent memorandum for acquisition professionals by 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD 
[AT&L]), improving the efficiency of acquisition of products and services is of utmost 
importance to the DoD (USD [AT&L], 2010. More specifically, in a later 
memorandum, the USD (AT&L) focused on “improving tradecraft in services 
acquisition” (USD [AT&L], 2010, p. 5) by strengthening and improving the services 
contracting process. An important part of the services acquisition process is the 
evaluation of contractor past performance information using the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS).  
The CPARS report is initiated by DoD contracting officers during the contract 
closeout phase of the contract management process for documenting contractor 
performance information on the completed contract. It is also used by DoD 
contracting officers during the source selection phase as part of the evaluation of 
contractor proposals. The CPARS report contains contractor performance 
information using objective scores in five categories: Quality, Schedule, Cost 
Control, Business Relations, and Management of Key Personnel. In addition to 
these five objective categories, the CPARS reports also provide a subjective 
narrative section where the contracting officer provides a descriptive narrative of the 
contractor’s performance. 
Although the use of contractor past performance information is an important 
aspect of the DoD contract management process, the GAO has identified many 
process deficiencies in the documentation and management of CPARS reports. 
GAO reports have shown that DoD agencies do not always complete the required 
contractor past performance reports (GAO, 2007, 2009b, 2013a, 2014). The 2012 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the DoD to “develop a strategy 
to ensure that evaluations in past performance databases used for making source 
selection decisions are complete, timely, and accurate” (GAO, 2014, p. 4). 
Additionally, the 2013 NDAA required a “government-wide strategy to ensure that 
timely, accurate, and complete information on contractor performance is included in 
past performance databases used by executive agencies for making source 
selection decisions” (GAO, 2014, p. 1).  
Subsequently, the DoD increased focus on training and education for 
contracting officers, which resulted in an increase in contractor performance 
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assessments being completed and submitted. In 2013, the GAO noted significant 
gains in CPARS completion rates: 56% of required reports were completed in 2011 
while 74% were completed in 2013. However, according to the same GAO report, 
over half of the CPARS reports were submitted late. More importantly, many CPARS 
reports contain narratives that are either insufficiently detailed or are in conflict with 
their associated objective scores. Late reports lacking sufficient accurate information 
provide less-than-optimal information to the contracting professionals that rely on 
these report cards for source selection and contract administration purposes (GAO, 
2013a).  
The purpose of this research is to determine the value of the CPARS 
narratives in services acquisition by comparing the relationships between the 
subjective narratives and the associated objective scores. Our analysis allows us to 
suggest improvements to the CPARS management process, thus leading to greater 
and more effective utilization of the CPARS reports in services acquisition. 
Research Methodology 
This research examines the value of CPARS report card narratives for service 
contracts as they relate to their associated objective scores. Our primary focus in 
this research is to examine if the CPARS report card written narrative section 
provides value to the contractor performance evaluation process. Our data analysis 
includes sentiment and statistical analysis, as well as interviews with government 
agency contracting professionals. Using CPARS data collected by graduate students 
Wilhite, Stover, and Hart (2013), and narrative analyses and interviews conducted 
by graduate students Black, Henley, and Clute (2014), we answer the following 
research questions: 
1. What is the added value of the contractor performance narratives 
beyond the value of the objective scores for performance? 
2. What is the statistical relationship between the sentiment contained in 
the narratives and the objective scores for contractor evaluations? 
3. To what degree do the interview findings contradict, support, or 
enhance the findings for our research questions? 
Literature Review 
Federal procurement policy requires that agencies collect information 
regarding a contractor’s performance under previously awarded contracts for all 
contracts over $100,000 and make that information available for use in future 
contract award decisions (Nash, Schooner, O’Brien-Debakey, & Edwards, 2007). 
The collection of contractor performance information occurs during the contract 
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closeout phase using the DoD Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting 
System (CPARS; Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
The CPARS assessment data reflects the contractor’s performance in specific 
areas including quality, schedule, cost control, business relations, management of 
key personnel, and utilization of small business. The “Quality” rating assesses the 
contractor’s qualitative performance and compares it to the requirements stated in 
the contract. The “Schedule” rating assesses the contractor’s ability to meet 
schedules outlined in the contract such as milestones, task orders, delivery 
schedules, and administrative requirements. The “Cost Control” rating assesses the 
contractor’s ability to forecast, manage, and control the costs associated with 
performing contracted services. The “Business Relations” rating assesses the 
contractor’s ability to coordinate its business activities such as cooperate behavior, 
customer satisfaction, management, and attitude towards customers. The 
“Management of Key Personnel” rating assesses the contactors ability to maintain 
qualified individuals in key positions as outlined in the contract. The “Utilization of 
Small Business” rating assesses the contractor’s ability to integrate small 
businesses in the execution of the contract (Wilhite et al., 2013). 
The CPARS assessment rates the contractor in these areas using the rating 
scales Exceptional, Very Good, Satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory. It should 
be noted that the contractor is allowed to review the CPARS assessment and 
provide comments back to the government assessing official prior to the government 
finalizing the CPARS report.  
During the source selection phase of government negotiated procurement, 
contractor performance information is used in evaluating offerors and in making a 
contract award decision (Rendon & Snider, 2008). In this phase, the government 
agency accesses the contractor performance information through the DoD Past 
Performance Information Retrieval System Report Cards (PPIRS-RC) database. 
During source selection in the evaluation of offeror’s proposals, the government 
agency uses the contractor past performance information to determine if the offeror 
meets the required standards of responsibility as stated in the federal procurement 
policy, and, depending on the basis of award stipulated in the solicitation, uses the 
contractor’s past performance ratings to justify an award to a higher-priced offeror.  
The contractor performance information reported in CPARS and accessible 
through PPIRS provides outcome-based data that can be used to identify successful 
contracts. The successful contracts determined by using contractor performance 
information have been used in our previous research to identify the contract 
variables that lead to contract success. 
In 2014, with the assistance of our graduate students (Wilhite, Hart, & Stover, 
2013), we accessed the past performance database to collect contractor 
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performance ratings on 715 completed Army services contracts to determine if the 
contracts were successful or not successful. Using statistical analysis we 
investigated whether certain contracting variables such as type of service, contract 
dollar value, level of competition, and contract type affected the success of the 
contract. The detailed results of our analysis are presented in Rendon, Apte, & 
Dixon (2014), while the salient findings are summarized as follows: 
• The S type services (Utilities and Housekeeping) had the highest 
failure rate of all the product service codes analyzed. The S type 
services had 11 contract failures resulting in a 3.77% failure rate. The 
reasons for contract failure included business relations and 
management of key personnel (Wilhite et al., 2013).  
• Contracts with a dollar value from $50 million to $1 billion had the 
highest failure rate of all the contract categories. Contracts with dollar 
values between $50 million to $1 billion category consisted of 92 
contracts with eight labeled failures, giving it a failure rate of 8.7%. This 
group’s most common reason for failing was cost control (Wilhite et al., 
2013).  
• With respect to competition in contracting, we found that contracts 
competed competitively had the highest failure rate when compared to 
the other two forms of competition available. Of the 540 competitive 
contracts, 17 were labeled as failures, which yields a failure rate of 
3.15%. The reasons that most often resulted in a contract failure were 
in the areas of schedule and cost control (Wilhite et al., 2013).  
• Concerning type of contract, we found that contracts structured as a 
combination contract had the highest failure rate when compared to 
the other five types of available contracts. There were four 
Combination contracts examined in the database. Of these four 
contracts, two were labeled failures, which yields a failure rate of 
50.0%. Schedule and cost were both referenced twice in the failed 
contracts while quality and management of key personnel were each 
referenced once (Wilhite et al., 2013). Furthermore, the results of our 
significance testing showed that Contractual Amounts and Contract 
Type were our only statistically significant variables (Wilhite et al., 
2013). 
We also looked at the relationships between percent of filled contract 
specialist (1102) billets and failure rates, and between workload dollars per filled 
billet and failure rates, and made some interesting observations. We found that as 
the percentage of 1102 filled billets increased, the contract failure rate decreased 
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(Wilhite et al., 2013). This would seem intuitive: that as the workforce increases, the 
contract success rate would also increase, since there would be sufficient resources 
to manage the contracting process. However, we also observed that as workload 
dollars per filled billet increased, contractor performance ratings also increased, and 
thus contract failure ratings decreased (Wilhite et al., 2013). This relationship 
seemed counterintuitive, since additional workload in the organization would typically 
place a higher demand on the workforce, thus resulting in fewer resources to 
manage the contracting process. One plausible hypothesis explaining this 
counterintuitive result is that “workload dollars per filled billet” are not good surrogate 
measures of the actual “average workload per billet.” We hope to investigate this 
hypothesis further in our future research. 
Our past research using CPARS data identified some interesting areas 
worthy of further exploration. These areas include analyzing the narrative portion of 
the CPARS ratings to determine alignment with the objective ratings, as well as the 
value added, not only in the narrative portions, but also in the usefulness of the 
CPARS as a contractor assessment tool. This is the focus of our current research 
project.  
Research Design 
Our research examines the value of the CPARS report card narratives for 
service contracts as they relate to their associated objective scores. The primary 
focus in this research is examining if the CPARS report card written narrative section 
provides value to the contractor performance evaluation process. Our data analysis 
included a sentiment analysis and statistical analysis, as well as interviews with 
government agency contracting professionals.  
With the assistance of our most recent MBA thesis students (Black, Henley, 
and Clute), we performed a sentiment analysis of the 715 Army service contract 
CPARS report card narratives accessed in our previous research (Rendon et al., 
2014). Our students used the CPARS Quality Checklist as a basis for developing the 
criteria for the categories and values for the sentiment analysis (CPARS Best 
Practices, Quality Checklist, n.d.). In the sentiment analysis, the student researchers 
scored each narrative along the dimensions of quality, robustness, compliance with 
directions in the CPARS Quality Checklist, and its value and content compared to its 
related objective scores from the CPARS report cards. Independent researchers’ 
scores were compared across a small sample to ensure inter-rater reliability.  
We conducted a statistical analysis of the relationship between the sentiment 
analysis scores and their associated objective rating scores. This analysis 
investigated correlating relationships between the sentiment scores and the 
objective rating scores for the same CPARS report. Our purpose was to explore the 
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relationships between the sentiment scores and the objective rating scores to reveal 
the extent of the value of the narratives. 
Our students (Black et al., 2014) also conducted interviews with contracting 
professionals from two DoD contracting agencies. These interviews focused on the 
agencies’ use of CPARS and other sources of contractor past performance 
information and agencies’ value of the CPARS narratives compared to the objective 
rating scores. 
Findings and Analysis 
In this section, we present an analysis of our findings. The primary purpose of 
this research was to determine the value of the CPARS narratives in services 
acquisition by comparing the relationships between the subjective narratives and the 
objective scores. We first present the findings of the sentiment and statistical 
analysis by focusing on each of the criteria used in the analysis. 
1. Do the narratives address all performance areas assessed? Overall, 
the narratives address all performance areas assessed ~82% of the time. This is 
less problematic with unsuccessful contracts at ~95% than with successful contracts 
at ~81%. The difference in the proportion of times that the narrative addresses all 
performance areas assessed in successful and unsuccessful contracts is statistically 
significant (p < .05; Black et al., 2014, p. 41). 
2. Are narratives based on objective data? Overall, the narratives are 
based on objective data ~77% of the time. However, in unsuccessful contracts, the 
narratives are based on objective data 100% of the time. This is significantly 
different from the ~77% in successful contracts (p < .01; Black et al., 2014, p. 41). 
3. Are narratives free of statements to avoid? Overall, the narratives are 
free of statements to avoid ~97% of the time. This is slightly more problematic with 
unsuccessful contracts at ~86% than with successful contracts at ~97% (p < .01; 
Black et al., 2014, p. 41).  
4. Are narratives robust and comprehensive? Overall, the narratives are 
robust and comprehensive ~63% of the time. This is less problematic with 
unsuccessful contracts at ~91% than with successful contracts at ~62% (p < .01; 
Black et al., 2014, p. 41). 
5. Could a layman understand the description of the work performed? 
Overall, the narratives are written so that a contracting layman should understand 
the work performed ~64% of the time. This is less problematic with unsuccessful 
contracts at ~82% than it is with successful contracts at ~64% (p < .05; Black et al., 
2014, p. 41). 
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6. Is the narrative beneficial above and beyond objective scores? Using 
a Chi Square Test, we determined that there was a difference between successful 
and unsuccessful contracts in whether the narratives were beneficial above and 
beyond the objective scores. Unsuccessful contracts tended to have more beneficial 
CPARS report card narratives than successful contracts (Black et al., p. 42). Overall, 
the narrative provides an unsatisfactory amount of beneficial data to the user ~12% 
of the time. However, there were no unsuccessful contracts that provided an 
unsatisfactory amount of beneficial data. The narrative provides a marginal amount 
of beneficial data ~22% of the time. There were no unsuccessful contracts that 
provided a marginal amount of beneficial data. The narrative provides a satisfactory 
amount of beneficial data ~28% of the time. The narrative provides a very good 
amount of beneficial data ~21% of the time. The narrative provides an exceptional 
amount of beneficial data ~18% of the time. This is much more likely to occur with 
unsuccessful contracts than with successful contracts at ~17% (Black et al., 2014, p. 
42). 
7. Do the narratives correlate to the objective scores assigned? Using 
the Chi Square Test, we determined that there was not a difference between 
successful and unsuccessful contracts in whether the narrative correlates to the 
objective scores assigned. Overall, the narrative sentiment is contradictory to more 
than one of the objective scores assigned ~2% of the time. The narrative sentiment 
is contradictory to one of the objective scores assigned ~6% of the time. The 
narrative sentiment is satisfactory in describing accurately why the objective scores 
are assigned as they are ~28% of the time. The narrative sentiment is very 
successful in describing accurately why the objective scores are assigned as they 
are ~40% of the time. The narrative sentiment is exceptionally successful in 
describing accurately why the objective scores are assigned as they are ~24% of the 
time (Black et al., 2014, p. 42). 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 7 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the results of the statistical analysis. 
 
Figure 1. Results of Statistical Database Analysis 
(Black et al., 2014) 
As previously discussed, our students also conducted interviews with 
contracting professionals from two DoD contracting agencies (Black et al., 2014). 
These interviews focused on the agencies’ use of CPARS and other sources of 
contractor past performance information as well as these agencies’ value of the 
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CPARS narratives compared to the objective rating scores in the source selection 
process. The findings of these interviews are summarized as follows: 
1. CPARS is still often not reliable, robust, or comprehensive enough. 
This results in source selection officials not placing a significant 
amount of weight on the past performance evaluation criteria (Black et 
al., 2014, p. 44).  
2. Unsuccessful contracts tend to have more reliable, robust, and 
comprehensive past performance information available in their 
CPARS/PPIRS reports (Black et al., 2014, p. 45).  
3. The appropriate amount of weight that should be assigned to the past 
performance evaluation criteria in making a source selection decision 
should be correlated to the source, availability, quality, and relevancy 
of the past performance information (Black et al., 2014, p. 45). 
4. The information found in PPIRS sometimes contains information in the 
narrative that is either contradictory or does not quite match up with the 
objective scores. When the objective scores and narrative sentiment in 
PPIRS is mismatched, contracting professionals tend to give more 
weight to the narrative versus the objective scores (Black et al., 2014, 
p. 46). 
5. Contracting professionals are not always applying due diligence in 
identifying the appropriate contractor entity (e.g., CAGE Code or 
DUNS number) in the CPARS reports. This is resulting in contractor 
past performance information not being fully accessible in PPIRS 
(Black et al., 2014, p. 46). 
6. There is a lack of reliable, robust, and comprehensive amount of past 
performance information available in PPIRS. This results in source 
selection officials soliciting contractors for references or asking 
contractors to fill out a past performance questionnaire (Black et al., 
2014, p. 47).  
7. The results of the interviews also identified recommendations for 
improving the quality of CPARS reports, incorporating data analytics 
tools into the PPIRS database, enhancing the monitoring of 
Contracting Officer Representative (COR) workload, improving 
acquisition workforce training on developing CPARS narratives, and 
improving the disclosure of CPARS program office Audit results (Black 
et al., 2014, pp. 48–49). 
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Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Summary 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquires billions of dollars of supplies and 
services every year. In FY 2013, the DoD obligated over $258 billion for military-
unique weapon systems as well as commercial supplies and services (USA 
Spending, 2013). An integral part of the DoD’s contract management process is the 
source selection phase when offerors’ proposals are evaluated and the contract 
award decision is made. A critical aspect of the source selection phase is the 
evaluation of contractor past performance information as part of the overall proposal 
evaluation process. The DoD uses the Past Performance Information Retrieval 
Systems (PPIRS) which consists of contractor report cards extracted from the 
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). Although the use 
of contractor past performance information is an important aspect of the DoD 
contract management process, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has 
identified many process deficiencies in the documentation and management of 
CPARS reports. GAO reports have shown that DoD agencies do not always 
complete the required contractor past performance reports (GAO, 2007, 2009b, 
2013a, 2014). More importantly, many CPARS reports contain narratives that are 
either insufficiently detailed or conflict with their associated objective scores. Late 
reports lacking sufficient accurate information provide less-than-optimal information 
to the contracting professionals that rely on these report cards for source selection 
decisions.  
The purpose of this research was to determine the value of the CPARS 
narratives in services acquisition by comparing the relationships between the 
subjective narratives and the objective scores. Our primary focus in this research 
was examining if the CPARS report card written narrative section provides value to 
the contractor performance evaluation process. Our data analysis included 
sentiment and statistical analysis, as well as interviews with government agency 
contracting professionals.  
Conclusions 
Using CPARS data collected by graduate students Hart, Stover, and Wilhite, 
(2013), and narrative analyses and interviews conducted by graduate students 
Black, Henley, and Clute (2014), we answered the following research questions: 
1. What is the added value of the contractor performance narratives 
beyond the value of the objective scores for performance? Contracting 
professionals are doing a better job at providing beneficial CPARS data in the 
narrative when the contract is unsuccessful versus when it is successful. Only 38.6% 
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of the observed CPARS narratives, whether successful or unsuccessful, provided a 
very good or exceptional amount of beneficial data above and beyond what could be 
gleaned from looking over the objective scores assigned (Black et al., 2014, p. 51). 
2. What is the statistical relationship between the sentiment contained 
in the narratives and the objective scores for contractor evaluations? 
Contracting professionals are developing CPARS narratives that contradict at least 
one of the objective scores assigned ~8.3% of the time. Contracting professionals 
were slightly better at matching the narrative sentiment to the objective scores in 
unsuccessful contracts (~81.8% scoring either very good or exceptional) than in 
successful contracts (~63.2% scoring either very good or exceptional; Black et al., 
2014, p. 51).  
3. To what degree do the interview findings contradict, support, or 
enhance the findings for our research questions? The results of the interviews 
found that the CPARS database is still often not reliable, robust, or comprehensive 
enough. We also found that unsuccessful contracts tend to have more reliable, 
robust, and comprehensive past performance information available in their 
CPARS/PPIRS reports. Additionally, the appropriate amount of weight that should 
be assigned to the past performance evaluation criteria in making a source selection 
decision should be correlated to the source, availability, quality, and relevancy of the 
past performance information. Our interviewees also stated that the information 
found in the PPIRS database sometimes contains information in the narrative that is 
either contradictory or does not quite match up with the objective scores. We also 
found that contracting professionals are not always applying due diligence in 
identifying the appropriate contractor entity in the CPARS reports, which is resulting 
in a lack of reliable, robust, and comprehensive amount of past performance 
information available in PPIRS. Finally, the interview results also identified 
recommendations for improving the quality of CPARS reports, incorporating data 
analytics tools into the PPIRS database, enhancing the monitoring of COR workload, 
improving acquisition workforce training on developing CPARS narratives, and 
improving the disclosure of CPARS program office audit results (Black et al., 2014, 
pp. 44–49). 
Recommendations 
Based on our conclusions, we identified the following five recommendations: 
Recommendation 1: Training. Training should be implemented for all 
services acquisition members that interact with the CPARS and PPIRS databases. 
Training should focus on developing comprehensive narratives ensuring that 
acquisition team members can fully understand the work performed, address all 
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performance areas assessed in their objective scores, and ensure the narratives are 
based on objective data (Black et al., 2014, pp. 54–55).  
Recommendation 2: Process Improvement. The DoD needs to improve the 
quality of past performance report submissions in CPARS and PPIRS, improving the 
source, availability, quality, relevancy, and accuracy of the past performance 
information. This will allow acquisition teams to assign higher weights to past 
performance evaluation criteria in source selection decisions (Black et al., 2014, pp. 
54–55). 
Recommendation 3: Data Analytics. Additional data analysis tools should 
be incorporated into the CPARS and PPIRS database to better assist contracting 
professionals in identifying past performance trends for a particular contractor or 
specific type of service (Black et al., 2014, pp. 54–55).  
Recommendation 4: Customer Feedback. The CPARS process should 
include customer feedback on contractor performance. Currently, only the 
acquisition team provides input to the CPARS report card. Customer input into 
CPARS will encourage the submission of more accurate and robust CPARS report 
cards (Black et al., 2014, pp. 54–55). 
Recommendation 5: COR Manning levels. Contracting Officer 
Representative (COR) manning levels should be reviewed throughout the DoD to 
ensure that organizations have sufficiently filled COR billets to manage the CPARS 
process (Black et al., 2014, pp. 54–55). 
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